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With	 the	 world	 becoming	 increasingly	 urban,	 the	 number	 of	 slums	 and	 squatter	
settlements	 has	 reached	 new	 levels.	 Alarming	 statistics	 on	 the	 urbanisation	 and	
housing	poverty	has	made	 the	metaphor	 “planet	of	 slums”	a	 global	 reality.	Between	
2000	 and	 2014,	 cities	 across	 the	world	 saw	 14%	 increase	 in	 the	 number	 of	 urban	











including	 low‐income	 people	 and	 the	 state	 taking	 the	 back	 seat	 to	 managing	 the	
institutional,	legislative	and	regulatory	environment.	In	this	sense,	enabling	is	enabling	
markets	 to	work	 and	 protecting	 them	 from	market	 failure	 (Angel,	 2000,	 p.15).	 The	
World	 Bank	 mainstreamed	 its	 application	 with	 ‘Enabling	 Housing	 to	Work’	 (1993)	
advocating	 that	 housing	 sector	 should	 be	 seen	 and	managed	 as	 part	 of	 the	 overall	





obligation	 to	 sign	 up	 to	 the	 key	 principles	 of	 enabling	 strategy	 advocated	 by	 these	
powerful	international	agencies.	Countries	such	as	Brazil	and	India	introduced	a	raft	of	
reforms	 to	entice	 the	private	 sector	 to	 supply	housing	 for	 all	 (including	 low‐income	
population)	 in	 tandem	 with	 a	 gradual	 withdrawal	 from	 public	 housing.	 	 Housing	
challenges,	however,	persisted	as	a	 large	number	of	people	continue	to	live	in	slums	
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and	 adaptations	 within	 the	 respective	 political	 structures	 of	 the	 countries.	 In	 both	
Brazil	and	India,	the	three	decades	of	policy	experiments	have	generated	an	inventory	
of	 ‘empirical	examples’	 through	a	series	of	 flagship	national	housing	programmes	of	
varying	 magnitude,	 scale	 and	 subsidy	 quotient.	 There	 appear	 to	 be	 compelling	
paradoxes	that	make	it	opportune	to	review	their	housing	programmes	to	explore	first,	
how	 far	 enabling	 strategies	 have	 been	 followed	 and	 second,	 to	 understand	 the	
conceptual	similarities	in	the	empirical	practices,	processes	and	outcomes.	While	both	
Brazil	 and	 India	provide	 regional	 leadership	and	 influence	on	global	housing	policy,	
ultimately	 they	 leave	 their	 housing	 challenges	unmet.	The	paper	does	not	 intend	 to	
																																																								
1 After three decades of implementation of enabling strategies, the number of Brazilians living in poor housing conditions 
has increased from 6.5 million in 2000 to 11.4 million in 2010 whereas in India, number of people living in substandard 
housing (still over one-third of the country’s population) has not gone down. 
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presents	 an	 overview	 of	 enabling	 housing	 paradigm	 followed	 by	 a	 review	 of	 the	









housing	 paradigm	 in	 response	 to	 the	 endemic	 housing	 shortage	 in	 several	 parts	 of	





worked	 well	 in	 many	 countries	 particularly	 in	 gaining	 rapid	 economic	 growth	 and	




complex.	 Three	 strands	 of	 scholarly	 criticism	are	 seen	 levelled	 against	 it.	 	 First,	 the	
historical	progress	has	been	characterised	by	 lower	overall	production	(Bhan,	2009,	
Islam,	1996;	Sengupta,	2006,	Tipple	and	Korboe,	1998;	Yap,	2015)	insufficient	to	filter	
through	 to	 the	 lower‐income	 segments	 of	 the	 society	 (Ahmed,	 1998;	 Ogu	 and	
Ogbuozobe,	 2001;	 Rondinelli,	 1990;	 Tipple,	 1994)	 or	 the	 informal	 sector	 (Durand‐
Lasserve,	 1987;	 Okpala,	 1994).	 Second,	 mortgage	 finance	 mechanism	 has	 shown	






groups)	 standpoints.	 As	 an	 object	 of	 academic	 enquiry,	 enabling	 strategy	 is	
predominantly	 framed	as	an	 issue	of	 coordination	and	governance	 in	 the	 context	of	
dramatic	 unevenness	 in	 the	 distribution	 of	 resources	 in	 different	 geographies	 and	
institutional	structures	of	urban	governance.	These	scholarships,	however,	converge	at	
and	highlight	the	inherent	inefficiency	of	the	enabling	mechanism	to	see	beyond	the	top	




many	 of	 the	 housing	 problems	 it	 ostensibly	 aspired	 to	 resolve	 such	 as	 economic	
stagnation,	 quantitative	 and	 qualitative	 housing	 shortage,	 unrealistic	 affordability	
thresholds	and	lack	of	access	to	formal	credit	etc.	The	severity	of	the	damage	was	such	






slowdown	 in	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 enabling	 strategy	 due	 to	 its	 contextual	
embeddedness	 within	 the	 popular	 neoliberalist	 tradition	 and	 associated	 economic	
arguments	 (that	 market	 was	 inherently	 more	 efficient	 and	 effective	 than	 the	
government).	A	great	deal	of	persuasive	writing	has	however	emerged	that	makes	a	




in	 India,	 he	 argues	 that	 the	 Indian	 government	 may	 need	 to	 embrace	 policy	
contradictions	 to	 ensure	 citizens’	 rights	 to	 housing	 and	 to	 curb	 apparent	 developer	
disinterest	to	serve	the	poor	within	the	enabled	market	environment.	A	decade	later,	
Cao	and	Keivani	(2014)		argue	for	government	intervention	to	enhance	social	housing	





2 This view builds on the emergent  trend  that began with Chinese government’s announcement of one of the largest 
social housing construction programmes in the world with an initial target of around 36 million units by 2015 (Wang and 
Shao, 2010) after two decades of intensive housing privatisation, in 2010. 
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housing	and	basic	services.	 In	response,	 the	past	decade	has	seen	a	sudden	surge	of	





























The	development	 trajectory	 in	Brazil	 in	 the	1980	and	1990s	has	been	 interspersed	by	debt	
crisis	 and	 the	 subsequent	 cumbersome	 structural	 adjustment	 programmes	 amidst	 rapid	





the	 1990s),	 especially	 in	 cities	 such	 as	 Rio	 and	 São	 Paulo3	were	marked	 by	 highly	
centralised	clearance	policy,	relocating	squatters	to	the	housing	centres	at	the	outskirts	




centralised	 system	 of	 housing	 finance	 which	 financed	 developers,	 public	 housing	
companies	(Companhias	Habitacionais	or	COHABS)	and	Housing	Cooperatives	(Instituto	
de	Orientacao	as	Cooperativas	Habitacionais	of	INOCOOPs)	throughout	the	region.	BNH	




With	 the	 abolition	 of	 the	 BNH4 	in	 1986,	 the	 urban	 and	 housing	 sectors	 saw	 an	
institutional	 vacuum	 at	 the	 federal	 level. Considered	 by	 Valenca	 (1998)	 as	 the	 ‘lost	
																																																								
3  See Pasternak and D’Ottaviano (2014) for details - they have divided the last 30 years of Brazilian housing into eight 
chronological periods. 
4 Established in 1964, the National Housing Bank or Banco Nacional da Habitação (BNH) operated until it was abolished 
in 1986 to be replaced by Caixa Econômica Federal. The abolition of the BNH was largely a political move, executed 
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nodes.	Conversely,	 the	 reduction	of	 federal	 programs	and	 regulations	opened	up	an	
important	window	for	policy	innovation	by	local	governments.	This	was	accompanied	
by	the	consolidation	of	democracy	with	the	first	free	state	and	municipal	elections	(in	









without any resistance from the people or civic society to capitalise on the public resentment of its inefficiency and 
corruption. The replacement Bank was also brought under control of the President Jose Sarney. (See Bonduki, 2014) 
5 For instance, in Osasco, COPROMO (Cooperativa Pró Moradia de Osasco/Osasco Pro-housing Cooperative) occupied 
and negotiated a large area of the city and built a housing project with 2,000 units through a community-built housing 





2000	the	empty	housing	stock	in	the	country	surged	 from	15.6%	to	17%	of	 its	 total	
housing	 stock	 (Table	 1).	 Empty	 buildings	 have	 continued	 to	 provide	 a	 viable	
opportunity	to	house	the	urban	poor	in	cities	such	as	Sao	Paulo	whilst	the	benevolent	
state	 acted	 as	 a	 facilitator	 in	 the	 process	 by	 altering	 legislations	 and	 constitutions,	
suggesting	 all	 properties	 have	 some	 social	 purpose.	 In	 Sao	 Paulo,	 the	 municipality	
policy	 focused	 on	 PROVER	 (Projeto	 de	 Urbanização	 de	 Favelas	 com	
Verticalização/Project	of	Squatter	Settlement	Upgrading	with	Verticalization)	known	
as	the	‘Cingapura	Project’	promoting		Apartment	style‐	vertical	units	(generally	5	to	11	
storied,	 with	 small	 units	 (42m2)	 	 constructed	 by	 private	 developers.	 Local	
municipalities	such	as	Diadema	proactively	identified	vacant	properties	and	allocated	
them	 for	 the	 construction	 of	 HIS	 (Habitação	 de	 Interesse	 Social/Social	 Interest	
Housing)	through	Special	Areas	of	Social	Interest	(AEIS)	I	and	II	in	their	master	plans.	
However,	despite	its	intellectual	and	inclusive	origin,		it	showed	the	hallmark	of	classic	













landscape	 saw	 rise	 of	 pro‐active	 municipal	 governments	 taking	 on	 the	 mantle	 of	
housing.	 Between	 2001	 and	 2004	 once	 again	 Workers	 Party	 took	 over	 the	
administration	 of	 Sao	 Paulo,	 reigniting	 the	 discourse	 on	 revitalization	 of	 empty	
buildings	 and	 a	 participation	 of	 the	 population	 as	 a	 way	 of	 building	 citizenship.	
Programmes	such	as	PRI	 (Programa	de	Recuperação	 Integrada/Integrated	Recovery	
Programme)	defined	areas	 for	urban	 interventions	 through	the	demarcation	of	ZEIS	
(Zonas	 Especiais	 de	 Interesse	 Social/Special	 Zones	 of	 Social	 Interest).	 Part	 of	 the	
interventions	was	also	made	by	the	state	government	through	the	PAC	(Programa	de	
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Atendimento	 aos	 Cortiços/Service	 Programme	 for	 Slums),	 in	 part	 supported	 by	 the	
Federal	 government	 through	 a	 comprehensive	 Home	 Lease	 Plan	 ‐	 PAR	 (Plano	 de	
Arrendamento	Residencial).	As	a	result	of	these	initiatives,	the	number	of	takeovers	of	
vacant	 buildings	 in	 the	 inner	 city	 increased.	 The	municipal	 administration	 used	 the	
Bairro	Legal	(Cool	Neighborhood)	Programme	as	a	tool	to	implement	a	set	of	integrated	




the	 non‐governmental	 organisations,	 and	 civil	 society.	 This	 bottom‐up	 approach	
enabled	low‐income	people	to	an	extent.	As	of	April	2002,	there	were	approximately	
2,866	projects	recorded	running	nation‐wide.	Upgrading	projects	geared	toward	basic	
sanitation	 but	 had	 difficulties	 in	 matching	 the	 urban	 standards	 of	 the	 formal	 city	
whereas	 resettlement	 into	 the	 city	 centre	was	 criticised	 for	 being	 fragmentary	 and	
																																																								
6	The priority areas for intervention were chosen according to a social exclusion criterion (defined as a situation of collective 
deprivation, which includes poverty, discrimination, subservience, inequity, non-accessibility, lack of public 
representation). The Bairro Legal was implemented in the first phase in Capão Redondo, Brasilândia, Lajeado, Jardim 
Ângela and Grajaú, since they had higher percentage of low-income families (15% or more). In phase two, it was extended 
to districts of Campo Limpo, Guaianazes, Iguatemi and Anhanguera. 
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into	 “My	House	My	 Life,”	 has	 had	 investments	 totalling	 	 an	 outlay	 of	 R$340	 billion	
(US$180	billion),	delivering	more	than	4	million	homes	which	include	2.6	million	units	
delivered	 to	 low‐income	 households.	 The	 Federal	 government	 expects	 more	 than	
twenty‐five	million	 people	 to	 be	 covered	 by	 the	 programme	 by	 2019.	 In	 2016,	 the	
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initiative	 hit	 a	 roadblock,	 when	 the	 incoming	 administration	 of	 President	 Temer	
announced	 it	was	halting	 the	authorisation	of	 the	 construction	of	up	 to	11,000	new	




both	political	 and	economic	 instability,	 it	has	shown	resilience	owing	 to	diversity	 in	
approaches	 and	 delivery.	 Amidst	 the	 hyper‐drive	 for	 home	 ownership	 through	
newbuilds	 and	 in	 an	 apparent	 fusion	 of	 ideas,	 	 the	 	 Epiringa	 and	 	 Rizkallah	 Jorge	
buildings7		in	Sao	Paulo	became	the	first	two	vacant	properties	financed	under	MCMV	
programme	 in	 2014	 and	 a	 rare	 example	 of	 rental‐subsidy.	 The	 Epiringa	 building	





7	The Rizkallah Jorge building in the city centre was built in the 1940s and was intended as a luxury hotel; instead, it 
became a company head office. Sixty years on, under the private initiative option of the Residential Leasing Programme, 
it has been converted into 167 studio apartments measuring 30–40 m2, each with a bed-sitting room, kitchen, bathroom 




mainstreaming	 conversions	 	 MCMV	 has	 legitimised	 community	 firepower	 and	
incremental	housing	approach,	both	important	pillars	of	low‐income	housing	delivery.	
At	the	macro‐economic	level,	neither	the	ideological	underpinnings	of	the	government	
intervention	 nor	 the	 level	 of	 subsidies	 was	 questioned	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
programme	was	launched	during	the	financial	crisis	of	2008.	Justified	as	a	government	
correction	to	market	failure,	its	initial	impetus	sprang	at	least	as	directly	from	the	need	
to	 keep	 Brazil’s	 economy,	 employment,	 and	 wages	 stable	 during	 the	 recession.	
However,	the	programme	remained	quintessentially	social	housing	and	heralded	the	











rate	materials.	This	 resulted	 in	 rather	small	 (of	around	32m2),	poor	quality	housing	
units	at	peripheral	locations,	devoid	of	critical	link	between	affordability,	design,	access	
and	mobility.	In	Rio	for	example,	53	percent	of	MCMV	units	delivered	before	2013	were	
located	 in	 the	 remote	 Far	 West	 Zone	 (up	 to	 four	 hours	 from	 the	 city).	 Despite	
operational	 challenges	 MCMV	 evinces	 Brazil’s	 increasing	 and	 demonstrable	
predisposition	towards	social	housing	for	those	who	cannot	afford	 ‘housing’	built	by	
private	 developers.	 The	 persistent	 housing	 shortage	 has	 influenced	 this	 trend.	
According	 to	 2010	 census,	 the	 housing	 shortage	 in	 Brazil	 	 stood	 at	 	 5.45	million.	 A	
further,	11.4	million	people	 lived	in	favelas,	 that	whilst	providing	a	housing	solution	
during	the	decades	of	rapid	urbanisation	but	condensed	leading	to	 ‘precarious	living	












by	 the	 object	 of	 its	 emphasis	 rather	 than	 the	 degree	 of	 government	 involvement	
(Sengupta	and	Tipple,	2007).	Slum	or	bustee	improvement	projects	took	primacy	in	the	
period	immediately	following	the	independence	from	British	rule.	The	1st	Five	Year	Plan	





8 National Building Organisation was created in 1954 to facilitate research in building construction activity. Town and 
Country Planning Organisation in 1962 to facilitate spatial planning activities across the country. At the state level, 
various Housing Boards were created during the same period.  
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internationally	 maverick9	approaches	 to	 tenure	 regularization	 such	 as	 the	 Calcutta	
Thika	Tenancy	Act	in	Kolkata	and	Chawls10	in	Mumbai	that	benefited	thousands	of	poor.	
The	period	between	the	1970s	and	1990	witnessed	state	acting	as	a	developer	to	build	




two	 pillars	 of	 governance	 architecture.	 	 Consistent	 with	 global	 trends	 of	
democratisation,	 the	dramatic	declaration	in	the	9th	Five	Year	Plan	“Housing	is	State	
[Government’s]	 subject”	 was	 abandoned	with	 	 the	 74th	 	 Constitutional	 amendment,	
which	made	 Urban	 Local	 Bodies	 (ULBs)	 responsible	 for	 housing	 and	 services.	 This	
‘decentralisation’	 turn	 marks	 a	 major	 departure	 from	 the	 provider	 regime,	 which	
predominantly	consisted	of	hierarchical	relations.	In	line	with	Bermeo’s	(1990,	p.368)	
																																																								
9 Thika Tenancy Act 1949 provided regularization of bustees or slum settlements with three tier ownership arrangement. 
Under this arrangement, bustee dwellers rent space in huts built by Thika tenants on land leased to them by the 
landowners. The Act confers protection against eviction and that land can be inherited not alienated. The settlements were 
assured of metered electricity connections. Concepts and Thika and Chawls were non-conformist and idiosyncratic 
approaches of tenure regularisation, implemented at a time when, internationally, eviction was widespread. 
10	Chawls are public or private rental housing built in 19th century by government or private landlords to accommodate 
the migrants coming from villages due to the rising employment in cotton industry. Chawls are buildings with one room 
or two room units of not more than 20m2 attached by a common corridor with shared toilets on each floor.	
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three	phases	of	democratisation11,	 Indian	democratisation12	went	 through	a	 gradual	
transfer	 of	 central	 powers	 to	 local and state governments in the 1990s. The devolved	







stronger	 in	 cases	 of	 mega	 cities	 Mumbai,	 Kolkata	 and	 Delhi,	 where	 the	 regional	
governments	 designed	 a	 welfare	 model	 with	 its	 own	 strong	 identity13 .	 Across	 the	
																																																								
11 According to Bormeo (1990, p.368) the breakdown of an authoritarian regime might be regarded as the first (analytical) 
phase of a democratisation process. The second phase then is the construction of a democratic regime, while the final 







13 However it should also be noted that these cities have not always promoted welfare interventions as real priorities for 
the city, despite the considerable budget at disposal. This reflects their attitudes and approach towards city development. 
For instance, Delhi’s approach has been rather heavy-handed toward low-income housing whilst Mumbai has made great 
efforts to address the problems by way of integration of transfer of development rights etc. 
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nation,	 liberalisation	 policy	 was	 introduced	 with	 a	 significant	 fanfare	 that	 led	 to	 a	
paradigmatic	 shift	 in	 housing	 delivery	 process.	 The	 public‐private	 partnership,	
regulatory	 reforms	 coupled	 with	 deregulated	 finance	 sector	 firmly	 established	 the	
government’s	role	as	an	enabler	of	housing,	with	a	 focus	on	all‐income	housing.	The	
National	Housing	policy,	1994	made	explicit	recognition	to	the	economic	contribution	
of	 the	 housing	 and	 construction	 sector	 in	 generating	 employment.	 Around	 25	 new	
housing	 finance	 institutions	(HFIs)	were	set	up	between	1990	and	2000	(Sahu	et	al,	
2009)	to	boost	lending	and	construction	activities	targeted	to	middle	and	high‐income	





(2008)	describes	SRP	as	marking	 	 a	 critical	 shift	 in	 the	 state’s	 role,	 as	a	provider	of	
public	 housing	 to	 that	 of	 a	 facilitator	 	 of	 construction	 of	 low‐income	 housing	 by	
optimising	on	Mumbai’s	complex	zoning	and	density	regimes	to	ensure	development	
rights	 	and	assuring	 	maximum	profits	for	private	builders	at	virtually	no	cost	to	the	





































14 Under the JNNURM, the Central government gives grants covering 50 per cent of the project cost for cities with 
population between one million and four million. For cities with population higher than four million, the Central grant is 
35 per cent of the project cost. The remaining funding comes from the state's kitty and the urban local bodies or parstatals. 




















15 Income classification has been the basis for means testing for welfare distribution in India for decades. With improving 
economy, income thresholds are revised. The latest revision shows   annual income of up to INR 100,000 to fall in the 
category of economically weaker section (EWS), according to new criteria formulated by the housing and urban poverty 
alleviation ministry. Households having income between INR 100,000 and INR 200,000 has been classified as low-






shortages	 in	 land	 and	 housing	 (Tiwari	 and	 Rao,	 2016).	 Quintessentially	 a	 slum	
rehabilitation	scheme	with	a	neoliberal	twist,	RAY	could	not	take	off	due	to	overlaps		




through	 states	 and/or	 Union	 Territories	 for	 in	 situ	 rehabilitation	 of	 existing	 slum	
dwellers	using	land	as	a	resource	through	private	participation,	interest	rate		subsidies	
on	 loans 16 	for	 housing	 EWS	 and	 LIG	 households.	 Under	 this	 programme	 the	
government	 has	 pledged	 to	 construct	 up	 to	 20	 million	 houses	 by	 the	 year	 2022	
(essentially	 aimed	 at	 matching	 the	 18.78	 m	 housing	 deficit)	 and	 according	 to	
preliminary	estimates,	 an	outlay	of	 INR3	 trillion	 (approximately	US$	44	billion)	has	
																																																								
16 Under this programme all eligible households are provided with a central grant between INR100,000- INR230,000 
(US$1483- US$3412) depending on locational factors and the loan with interest subsidy of 6.5 per cent payable in 15 




glorifying	 the	 incumbent	Prime	Minister	Narendra	Modi	 for	 initiating	 a	 panacea	 for	
housing.	 Whilst	 this	 is	 too	 early	 to	 critique	 the	 programme,	 a	 close	 scrutiny	 of	
ingredients	of	PAY	shows	apparent	adhockery	and	inconsistency	and	their	deliveries	
remain	 questionable	 due	 to	 supply‐side	 and	 demand‐side	 challenges.	 Availability	 of	
land	will	be	a	major	challenge	 to	ensure	construction	of	10	million	houses	 in	urban	
areas	for	EWS	which	will	require	57,000	acres	of	urban	land	(roughly	50%	of	total	land	
in	 Mumbai).	 Regulatory	 infrastructural	 reforms	 are	 still	 outstanding.	 Furthermore,	
capacity	of	the	construction	and	building	material	industry	to	construct	3	million	plus	
units	 per	 annum	 is	 seriously	 doubted,	 as	 the	 delivery	 in	 the	 last	 five	 years	 has	 not	
exceeded	one	million.	India	thus	needs	to	up	its		output	by	10	folds	in	the	next	7‐8	years	
to	 achieve	 this	 new	 goal.	 More	 crucially,	 	 the	 programme	 designed	 under	 enabling	








in	 India	have	hung	on	 to	neoliberal	qualities	especially	 in	creating	opportunities	 for	
private	sector,	thus	blurring	the	lines	between	enabling	and	provider	approach.	It	can	
be	argued	 	 that	 these	programmes	have	 introduced	an	 increasingly	commercial	and	






than	 innovation.	According	 to	 the	12th	 	Five‐year	plan	(2012	–	2017)	urban	housing	
shortage	 in	 the	 country	 stands	 at	 18.78	million	 units	 that	 is	 expected	 to	 grow	 at	 a	
																																																								
17 Affordable housing components with PAY relies on diverse arrangement including developer-led redevelopment of 
slum area, credit‐linked	subsidy	disbursement	to	EWS	and	LIG	with	the	government	sitting	as	a	guarantor,	direct	
subsidy	to	parastatal	agencies	for	schemes	delivering	a	minimum	of	35%	EWS	units	and	loans	for	building	
individual	homes	for	EWS	population.	Ironically, a scheme promoted as being quintessentially affordable could have 
wholly targeted to promote home ownership in EWS category. This refutes the principle of positive intervention, as 
especially, demand coming from EWS far exceeds supply and in this context, government should be seeking to fill the gap 

















population.	 India	may	soon	be	 forced	 to	 follow	Brazil’s	 lead	on	 empty	properties	 in	
urban	areas.		
																																																								








One	 of	 the	 early	 and	 probably	 most	 common	 views	 on	 enabling	 approach	 (as	 an	
offshoot	 of	 neoliberalism)	 within	 housing	 studies	 depicts	 neoliberalism	 to	 be	
unfavourable	to	urban	poor.		Neoliberalism	is	studied	and	described	for	its	supposed	
effects	 on	 the	 poor,	 characterised	 by	 privatisation,	 deregulation	 and	 diminishing	
welfare	benefits	and	accelerating	poverty,	increasing	the	number	of	households	living	
in	slums	and	favelas	around	the	world.		Clearly,	a	dominant	trend	emerging	from	the	









shift	 from	 the	 enabler	 regime	 to	 a	 provider	 one	 (Table	 2).	 For	 example,	 the	MCMV	






caution	 that	 these	programmes	 should	be	 viewed	as	 an	open‐ended,	 trial	 and	 error	






19 For instance, projects in India combine cash and credit subsidy that shows greater breadth than Brazil’s deeper cash 
subsidy. 
	 32






credit,	 in	 turn,	 bringing	 low‐income	 homes	 within	 the	 wider	 financial	 circuits.		









1995).	 	 On	 the	 contrary,	 the	 low‐income	 households 20 	are	 actually	 looking	 for	 an	
enclosure	 that	 gives	 them	sense	of	 	 a	 security	 and	permanence	 to	 live	 as	well	 as	 to	
engage	 in	employment	opportunities.	 Ironically,	 the	concept	of	 finished	home	is	still	
embedded	 in	 these	 modernising	 projects	 often	 achieved	 through	 relocation	 posing	
problems	 to	 both	 beneficiaries	 as	 well	 as	 the	 project.	 The	 impact	 on	 the	 former	 is	
related	to	loss	of	social	network	that	plays	a	significant	role	in	accessing	job	or	informal	
credit,	 whilst	 the	 ownership‐led	 programmes	 do	 not	 nurture	 this.	 Instead,	
homeownership	 actually	 increases	 their	 cost	 of	 living,	 and	 quite	 often,	 turns	 out	
unaffordable	due	to	associated	costs	such	as	property	tax,	registration	fee,	capital	gains	
etc.	 	 In	a	study	of	Affordable	Housing	Partnership	scheme	 in	Gujrat,	Barnhardt	et	 al	
(2015)	 found	 	 the	 loss	of	social	capital	 to	be	a	major	driver	 for	more	than	one‐third	
households	 to	 abandon	 the	 newly	 acquired	 homes	 and	 to	 return	 to	 their	 original	
location.	These	projects	also	face	 	additional	financial	burden	associated	with	higher	
subsidies	 as	 project	 costs	 go	 up	 to	 deliver	 these	 ‘complete	 homes’.	 In	 India,	 RAY	
experienced	delays	in	finding	new	land	leading	to	cost	escalations,	which,	in	turn,	meant	
																																																								
20 Our informal interviews with households living in Favelas and slums confirm this view. Both researchers 




beneficiaries.	 Conversely,	 shoots	 of	 innovations	 have	been	witnessed	 in	Brazil,	with	
“tenant‐based”	housing	subsidies	for	reusing	such	vacant	properties,	as	especially,	with	
the	 landmark	 decision	 to	 fund	 the	 Epiranga	 project	 with	 MCMV,	 the	 concept	 of	
‘incremental	 housing’	 has	 been	 brought	 to	 the	 mainstream.	 Incremental	 housing,	 ,	
considered	a	viable	splinter	of	housing	supply	received	much	attention	internationally	
with	 Architect	 Alejandro	 Aravena’s	 popular	 concept	 of	 building	 only	 the	 physical	
foundations,	 walls,	 stairs,	 kitchen	 and	 bathrooms	 of	 the	 homes.	 In	 India,	 slum	 and	
squatter	population	have	been	known	to	take	this	approach.	De	Soto’s	(2000)	thesis	














































MISCONCEPTION	 #3:	 Government	 has	 created	 conditions	 for	 effective	 private	 sector	
operation	
	





goals	 together,	 hint	 at	 greater	 financial	 outlay	 to	 deliver	 new	 homes	 and	 as	 a	
consequence,	a	need	to	rely	on	the	private	capital.	However	barring	few	projects	that	
were	 designed	 under	 PPP	 principle,	 conditions	 to	 attract	 private	 capital	 are	 still	
outstanding.	 For	 instance,	 in	 India,	 this	 relates	 to	 slow	 and	 uneven	 progress	 in	 the	
several	aspects	of	regulatory	reforms.		The	slow	progress	in	reforming	the	Rent	Control	




to	 be	 governed	 by	 the	 earlier	 Act.	 	 	 Amendments	 of	 city	 Master	 Plans	 to	 include	
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unauthorised	settlements	has	been	even	slower	as	Bhan	(2009)	argues	progressive	city	
governments	 such	 as	Delhi	 have	 continued	 to	 ignore	 the	 alleged	 ‘blackspots’	 in	 the	
periphery	causing	uncertainty	over	land	availability	in	the	city	fringes.	Likewise,	reform	











the	 ULBs	 were	 dependent	 on	 the	 state’s	 reforms	 in	 order	 to	 release	 agreed	 funds	
resulting	 in	 delays	 in	 project	 implementation	 (Sharma,	 2013).	 The	 ‘one‐size‐fits‐all’	
approach	of	demanding	that	all	states	and	ULBs	achieve	23	reforms	within	seven	years	
















As	 explained	 in	 the	 earlier	 narratives,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 decentralisation	 is	 central	 to	
providing	 a	 new	 context	 within	 which	 low‐income	 housing	 in	 Brazil	 and	 India	 is	
emerging.	More	precisely,	decentralisation	is	taking	place	in	the	context	of	neoliberal	
national	 macroeconomic	 environment.	 Whilst	 the	 concept	 is	 unproblematic	 as	
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decentralised systems of housing delivery involving market actors, government agencies and 
NGOs is set against the general context of neoliberalism, without	adequate	empowerment	
of	 local	 actors,	 the	 process	 breeds	 ambivalence	 and	 inconsistency.	 For	 instance,	 the	
flagship	programmes	both	in	India	and	Brazil	have	ignored	their	inherent	weakness,	
which	relates	to	lack	of	understanding	of	the	capacity	at	the	local	level.	Higher	goals	set	







top–down	 approach,	 with	 poor	 participation	 from	 the	 state	 governments,	marginal	
inputs	 from	the	operational	agencies	and	 lacked	public	participation.	Livengood	and	
Kunte	 (2014)	 claim	 NGO	 and	 CBO	 participation	 in	 BSUP	 projects,	 like	 those	 under	
VAMBAY,	 had	 no	 place	 in	 the	 decision‐making	 process.	 The	 eligibility	 lists,	 house	
designs,	specifications	and	terms	and	conditions	are	developed	before	NGOs	and	slum	






of	 the	smaller	ULBs	do	not	have	 the	capacity	 to	prepare	City	Development	Plan,	but	
endorsed	it	notionally	so	that	projects	could	be	submitted	to	the	Centre	and	funds	could	
flow	to	the	city	(Sivaramakrishnan,	2011).	The	complex	requirements	set	by	RAY	for	
technology‐laden	data	 collection	and	 analysis	 before	 local	 plans	 and	 funding	 can	be	
approved	has	been	an	exclusionary	practice	(Livengood	and	Kunte,	2014).	This	mirrors	
the	 technical	 requirements	 forced	 by	 JNNURM	 resulting	 in	 exclusion	 of	most	 of	 the	
economically	less	advanced	states.	On	the	other	hand,	very	little	of	the	funds	set	aside	
for	 capacity	 building	 has	 been	 effectively	 used.	 In	 India	 individual	 states	 feel	
marginalised	 and	 lose	 appetite	 to	 drive	 ambitious	 programmes.	 Without	 active	
participation,	 the	 city	 Master	 Plans	 developed	 by	 participating	 state	 governments	
remain	 divorced	 from	 the	 urban	 planning	 process	 and	 lack	 connectivity.	 The	
decentralisation	 of	 housing	 delivery	 in	 Brazil	 is	 relativelymore	 advanced	 with	
incentives	for	setting‐up	state	and	municipal	funds	and	councils,	aimed	at	producing	








framework.	 Both	 countries	 have	 initiated	 state	 administered	 large‐scale	 housing	
programmes	 within	 diverse	 institutional	 contexts	 quite	 in	 line	 with	 the	 emerging	
international	trend	in	low‐income	housing	delivery	(Buckley	et	al,	2006).	The	processes	
perhaps	 include	 more	 issues	 and	 practices	 than	 we	 can	 cover	 here.	 The	 paper,	
therefore,	draws	attention	to	major	observations.	First,	the	continuous	production	of	
public	housing	 in	various	 forms	to	support	 the	 low‐income	households;	and	second,	
governments	both	in	Brazil	and	India	are	adhering	to	enabling	housing	framework	and		
the	state	is	taking	onto	itself,	the	responsibility	to	provide	for	the	poor.	Thus,	as	one	











relaxed	 in	 recent	 years	 favouring	 bricks	 and	 mortar	 investment	 over	 individual	
subsidies.	In	a	poignant	advice	to	governments	around	the	world,	UN‐Habitat	(2016)	
imparts	 a	 clear	 message	 to	 avoid	 privatization	 of	 public	 rental	 housing	 where	 it	
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